







According to the Identity of the Real: 
The Non-Philosophical Thought of Immanence
Abstract
Are the things of this world given to thought? Are things really meant to be known, to be 
taken as the objective manifestations of a transcendental conditioning power? The Western 
philosophical tradition, according to Francois Laruelle, presupposes just this transcen-
dental constitution of the real – a presupposition that exalts philosophy itself as the des-
ignated recipient of the transcendental gift. In our article on Laruelle’s trenchant project 
we try to show how this presupposition controls even the ostensibly radical critiques of the 
philosophical tradition that have proliferated in the postmodern aftermath of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. An effective critique of philosophy must be non-philosophical. It must, accord-
ing to Laruelle, suspend the presupposition that otherness is given to be known, that thought 
has a fundamentally differential structure. Non-philosophy begins not with difference, not 
with subject and object, but with the positing of the	 One. From this axiomatic starting 
point, non-philosophy takes as its material philosophy, rethought according to the One. 
The non-philosophy project does not, like so much postmodern philosophy, herald the end 
of philosophy. It takes philosophy as an occasion to raise the question of another kind of 
thought – one that, instead of differentially relating to the world that it presupposes, asserts 
that it is ultimately, in the flesh, at One with what it can never know.
Key words
non-philosophy,	immanence,	One,	difference,	Real
































real	 to	 the	negative	correlate	of	 the	philosophical	 concept.	Thought	under-
taken	in	the	absence	of	this	presupposition	is,	by	Laruelle’s	definition,	“non-
philosophy”.	The	 inaugurating	 postulate	 of	 non-philosophy	 is	 that	 thought	
is	in	no	way	other	than	the	real;	the	relation	of	thought	and	the	real	cannot,	





The	modern	emphasis	on	 the	difference	of	philosophy	 from	what	 it	would	
know	is,	on	Laruelle’s	account,	fundamentally	consistent	with	the	meta-phil-
osophical	 ambition	 that	 has	 characterized	philosophy	 from	 its	 pre-Socratic	
beginnings.	Philosophy	has	always	tried	to	get	outside	itself	so	as	 to	know	
itself	by	accounting	for	its	own	possibility	–	the	possibility	of	its	systematic	




































The differential identity of modern philosophy















The	 difficulty	 of	 this	 undertaking	 became	 evident	 for	 Laruelle	 during	 his	
study	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	of	Heidegger,	Nietzsche,	Derrida,	and	Deleuze,	

















The	 author	 who	 has	 done	 the	 most	 to	 bring	
Laruelle	to	the	attention	of	the	English-speak-
ing	 world	 is	 Ray	 Brassier.	 The	 account	 of	
Laruelle	 in	 this	 introduction	 has	 benefited	
from	 Brassier’s	 presentation	 of	 Laruelle’s	
project	in	his	essay	“Axiomatic	Heresy:	The	
Non-Philosophy	of	Francois	Laruelle”,	Radi-






authors	in	Les Philosophies de la Difference: 
Introduction Critique	(Paris:	PUF,	1986).	This	
work	has	recently	been	published	in	English	
translation	 as	 Philosophies of Difference: 
A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy,	























struction	has	not	 relinquished	meta-philosophical	ambition,	 for	 the	 identity	
that	it	places	beyond	self-differing	philosophy	is	still	defined	in	terms	of	the	
frustration	of	meta-philosophical	desire,	the	impossibility	of	self-closure.
The event as philosophical decision








elle	with	 the	 relative	 transcendence	of	 knowledge	 about	 being,	 knowledge	
as	meta-).	Philosophy	allows	 for	 the	disruption	of	 this	mode	of	 thought	 in	
the	 emergence	 or	 breaking-in	 of	 its	 other	 –	 which	 may	 be	 either	 a	 deeper	


























thought	 in	 terms	of	each	other.	The	 transcendental	 terms	are	hybridized	 to	
account	for	the	appearance	of	discrete	and	knowable	beings;	the	same	terms	
are	 polarized	 and	 fused	 to	 evoke	 the	 event	 that	 transcends	 and	 transforms	
these	beings.	The	epekeina	and	the	meta-,	the	relative	and	the	absolute,	form	




















that	philosophy	must	 resist;	 its	 skill	 is	 the	derivation	of	 the	 transcendental	
–	 the	 transcendental	 that	 is	 its	unacknowledged	presupposition.	The	event,	




Presupposed by thought: the real transcendental
The	philosophical	circle	can	only	be	broken	by	real	knowledge	of	philosophy,	





















requires	 the	 suspension	of	 the	 subjective	 self-constitution	of	philosophy	 in	
the	transcendental	circle	of	conditioning	and	conditioned,	or	given-ness	and	
being-given.
















that	 it	 be	 known	 according	 to	 its	 actual	 given-ness	 –	 the	 determination	 or	
conditioning	 by	 which	 it	 really	 comes	 to	 appear.	 Philosophy	 must	 then	 be	
































Immanence is identity: the axiom according to the One
With	 this	 primary	 axiom	 non-philosophy	 suspends	 the	 presupposition	 by	











“immanence	 to	 self”	 that	 defines	 Deleuze’s	 virtual	 plane	 of	 immanence	 is	

















































































How	can	 the	 subject	 experience	 the	causation	by	which	 it	 is?	This	experi-






























ing	 itself	 and	 the	 world	 as	 interrelated	 objects	 of	 mutual	 determination	 or	
conditioning.	According	to	the	vision-in-One,	the	subject	and	the	objects	to	










only	 through	 its	 own	 immanence.	As	 immanent	 identity,	 the	One	does	not	
give	itself	as	that	which	conditions	or	produces	the	objects	of	the	world;	the	
One	remains	itself,	independent	of	the	world	precisely	because	it	is	identical	
to	 it	 in	 the	 last	 instance.	 Seen	 apart	 from	 this	 identity,	 the	 world	 is	 an	 ar-
ray	of	dynamically	interrelated	objects	which	develop	and	affect	each	other	
in	philosophically	 interpretable	processes.	But	when	seen	 in	 its	 radical	 im-
manence,	 the	world	of	philosophy	can	 serve	as	an	occasional	 cause	of	 the	
non-philosophical	 vision-in-One.	And	 in	 fact	 for	 subjects	 in	 the	 world	 the	
vision-in-One	must	always	be	occasioned	in	this	way	–	as	the	non-intuitive	


























surface	 of	 this	 immanence,	 is	 not	 a	 visible	 composure;	 it	 is	 formed	 in	 the	
vision	 that	 sees	 everything,	 including	 itself,	 as	 unilaterally	 (“uni-facially”)	
given,	untraceably	and	irretrievably	–	as	given	entirely	to	the	future.
Cloning: philosophy and non-philosophy
Philosophy	gives	itself	as	absolute,	self-positing,	autonomous.	But	it	is	also	
given	according	to	the	One	as	“relatively	autonomous”.	The	“taking	into	ac-
count”	of	 the	 relative	autonomy	of	philosophy	 is	what	 the	non-philosophi-
cal	subject	“does”.	The	relativity	of	philosophy’s	autonomy	does	not	simply	
negate	philosophy	or	the	philosophical	subject;	the	exposure	of	the	illusions	































The	cloning	of	philosophy	 is	what	Laruelle	calls	 the	“transcendental	 func-




















from	what	it	gives.	It	 is	foreclosed	from	what	it	gives	because	it	 is	what	 it	








Advent: the immanence of the future
Laruelle	 claims	 that	 non-philosophy	 separates	 philosophy	 from	 its	 objects	

































In	 the	 non-philosophical	 advent,	 the	 release	 of	 the	 philosophy-world	 from	
its	 own	 self-sufficiency	 is	 not	 the	 transcendence	 of	 this	 world.	The	 future	
towards	which	the	world	is	turned	cannot	be	beyond	the	given.	Whereas	the	
























identity	 that	 is	 foreclosed	 from	 the	world,	 and	 to	 the	 theorems	 that	 follow	
from	this	axiom.	The	subject	lives	in	the	faithful	application	of	these	axioms	
to	philosophical	material	and	also,	as	in	some	of	Laruelle’s	most	recent	work,	
to	 religious	material.3	The	non-philosophical	 or	 non-religious	 subject	 lives	
only	in	this	application.	Arriving	as	if	from	nowhere,	from	no	time	or	place	
apart	 from	 the	world	 as	 it	 is,	 the	Stranger-subject	 posits	 the	vision-in-One	












































in	 the	postulation	of	 immanent	 identity	–	and	 this	postulation	 is	 in	 the	 last	
instance	identical	to	the	materials	of	mediated	worldly	knowledge	that	func-







The	positing	of	 the	ultimate	 identity	of	 the	One	 is	empty	and	meaningless	
apart	from	the	structures	of	worldly	knowing	that	it	neutralizes	and	suspends.	
The	 articulation	of	 the	vision-in-One	occurs	only	 in	 the	 faithfully	 asserted	
identity-without-synthesis	 of	 particular	 determinations	 of	 immanence	 and	
transcendence,	of	objectivity	and	its	philosophical	derivation.	The	vision-in-
One	must	therefore	be	posited	or	effectuated	again	and	again,	always	through	
its	 neutralization,	 without	 negation,	 of	 particular	 hierarchical	 structures	 of	
worldly	knowledge.	The	faith	of	Christ,	according	to	Laruelle,	lives	only	in	
3
See	 especially	 Le Christ futur: un lecon 
d’heresie	 (Paris:	 Exils	 Editeur,	 2002).	 This	
book	has	recently	been	published	in	English	
translation	as	Future Christ: A Lesson in He-
resy,	 trans.	 Anthony	 Paul	 Smith	 (London:	
Continuum,	 2010).	 Laruelle	 extends	 this	
work,	 especially	 as	 it	 concerns	 the	 relation	
of	 belief	 and	 faith,	 in	 the	 essay	 “A	 Science	
in	Christ”,	trans.	Aaron	Riches,	in	The Gran-
deur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Uni-
versalism, eds.	Peter	Candler,	 Jr.	 and	Conor	
Cunningham	(Canterbury:	SCM,	2010).	Here	






























































































serted	 identity	 to	Law	and	Logos,	 are	 the	model	 for	 the	non-philosophical	
and	non-religious	positing	of	 radical	 immanence	–	 to	 the	extent	 that	Laru-
elle’s	proposed	generic	 science	of	 religion	would	be	a	“science	 in	Christ”.	






Mystique non-philosophique a l’usage des 
contemporains	(Paris:	L’Harmattan,	2007).
5
Etienne	 Gilson,	 commenting	 on	 a	 passage	
from	Aquinas’	De Potentia	 (q.	3,	a.	1),	 says	
that	“creation	is	not	a	change,	because	to	cre-
ate	is	not	to	make	something	from	something	
else…”	See	Etienne	Gilson,	The Elements of 
Christian Philosophy	(New	York:	Doubleday,	
1960),	 193.	 Herbert	 McCabe,	 OP,	 follow-
ing	 Gilson,	 pointedly	 summarizes	 the	 rel-


















ply	 an	 arbitrary	name	 for	 the	 life	 of	 generic	 scientific	 procedures	 that	 can	
arrive	anytime	and	anywhere,	 inexplicably	and	without	condition,	 then	 the	
figure	of	Christ	takes	on	an	exceptional	eminence	–	in	other	words,	transcend-


















cannot,	 even	 in	 the	 last	 instance,	 be	 foreclosed	 from	 any	 form	 of	 worldly	
knowledge.	Transcendence	as such	is	foreclosed:	that	which	gives	the	world	








to	 believe	 in	 the	 living	 reality	 of	 transcendence-in-immanence.	 It	 is	 to	 re-
ceive	the	world	as	dynamically	structured	at	its	deepest	level	by	an	incarnate	
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is	 being,	 although	 everyone	 of	 them	 has	 its	
proper	 effect,	 and	 this	 distinguishes	 it	 from	
the	others….There	must	therefore	be	a	cause	
higher	 than	 all	 the	 causes,	 a	 cause	 because	
of	which	they	themselves	cause	being…”	At	
the	 basis	 of	 all	 causal	 efficacy,	 says	 Gilson	








being	 of	 their	 effects,	 finite	 beings	 are	 effi-
cient	causes	only	inasmuch	as,	in	acting,	they	
imitate	the	first	efficient	act,	cause	of	all	other	
beings	 as	well	 as	of	 their	 causal	 fecundity.”	







Prema identitetu realnog: 
Ne-filozofska misao imanencije
Sažetak
Jesu li stvari ovog svijeta nešto što je dano samoj misli? Jesu li stvari tako mišljene da budu 
spoznatljive, da budu objektivne manifestacije transcendentalno uvjetovanih moći? Zapadna 
filozofska tradicija prema Francoisu Laruellu pretpostavlja tu transcendentalnu konstituciju 
realnog. To je pretpostavka koja uzdiže samu filozofiju kao označenu primateljicu transcen-
dentalnog dara. U našem članku o Laruellovom projektu želimo pokazati kako ta pretpostavka 
kontrolira čak i prividno radikalne kritike filozofske tradicije koje su se umnožile kao posljedice 
Nietzscheovog i Heideggerovog mišljenja. Zato učinkovita kritika filozofije mora biti ne-filozof-
ska. Ona prema Laruellu mora dokinuti pretpostavke da je drugotnost dana da bi bila spoznata, 
kao što mora dokinuti pretpostavku kako sama misao ima fundamentalno drugačiju strukturu. 
Ne-filozofija počinje ne sa razlikom, ne sa subjektom i objektom, nego sa pozicioniranjem Jed-
nog. Od te početne aksiomatske točke, ne-filozofija uzima kao vlastitu materijalnu filozofiju 
ponovno mišljenje u odnosu na Jedno. Ne-filozofski projekt ne započinje kao što to čini postmo-
derna filozofija s naviještanjem kraja filozofije. On uzima filozofiju kao prigodu da postavi pita-
nje drugačije vrste mišljenja – onog koji, umjesto da se diferencirajći odnosi prema svijetu koji 




Gemäß der Identität des Realen: 
der nichtphilosophische Gedanke der Immanenz
Zusammenfassung
Sind die Dinge dieser Welt etwas dem Gedanken Gegebenes? Sind sie gemeint, um erkannt 
zu werden, um als objektive Manifestationen transzendental bedingter Kräfte betrachtet zu 
werden? Die westliche philosophische Tradition, Francois Laruelle zufolge, setzt gerade di-
ese transzendentale Konstitution des Realen voraus – eine Sehweise, die die Philosophie an 
sich als designierte Empfängerin der transzendentalen Gabe lobpreist. In unserem Artikel zum 
Laruelles zielbewussten Projekt versuchen wir zu schildern, wie die betreffende Voraussetzung 
sogar die vorgeblich radikalen Kritiken der philosophischen Tradition der Kontrolle unterwirft, 
die sich in der postmodernen Nachfolgeperiode von Nietzsche und Heidegger vermehrt haben. 
Die effektive Kritik der Philosophie muss nichtphilosophisch sein. Laut Laruelle soll sie die 
Annahmen ausschließen, wonach die Anderheit zum Erkennen gegeben sei und der Gedanke 
eine elementar ungleiche Struktur besitze. Die Nichtphilosophie setzt nicht mit der Differenz 
an, nicht mit dem Subjekt und Objekt, sondern mit der Postulierung des	 Einen. Von diesem 
axiomatischen Ausgangspunkt her fasst die Nichtphilosophie die Wiederabwägung gegenüber 
dem	Einen als eigene materielle Philosophie. Das nichtphilosophische Projekt sagt nicht, wie 
vorab die postmoderne Philosophie, den Ausklang der Philosophie an. Vielmehr beurteilt es die 
Philosophie als die Gelegenheit zur Fragestellung nach einer anderen Eigenheit des Denkens 
– jenes, welches anstatt vielschichtig von der Welt zu handeln, die es voraussetzt, letzten Endes 








Selon l’identité du réel : 
la pensée non-philosophique de l’immannence
Résumé
Les choses de ce monde sont-elles données à la pensée ? Les choses sont-elles supposées être 
connues, être des manifestations objectives d’un pouvoir conditionné transcendantalement ? 
La tradition philosophique occidentale, selon François Laruelle, présuppose cette constitution 
transcendantale du réel. Une présupposition qui exalte la philosophie elle-même en tant que 
réceptrice désignée du don transcendantal. Dans notre article sur le projet de Laruelle, nous 
souhaitons montrer que cette présupposition incisive contrôle même des critiques soi-disant ra-
dicales de la tradition philosophique, qui ont proliféré à la suite de la pensée de Nietzsche et de 
Heidegger. C’est pourquoi une critique efficace de la philosophie doit être non-philosophique. 
Selon Laruelle, elle doit suspendre la présupposition que l’altérité est donnée pour être connue 
et que la pensée a une structure fondamentalement différente. La non-philosophie commence, 
non pas avec la différence, ni avec le sujet et l’objet, mais avec la postulation de l’Un. Partant 
de ce point axiomatique, la non-philosophie prend comme matériau la philosophie repensée 
selon l’Un. Le projet non-philosophique ne commence pas, comme tant de philosophie post-mo-
derne, en annonçant la fin de la philosophie. Il prend la philosophie comme occasion de poser 
la question d’une autre sorte de pensée – une sorte qui, au lieu de se rapporter au monde qu’elle 
présuppose en se différenciant, affirme qu’elle est, en dernière instance, en chair et en	os en	Un 
avec ce qu’elle ne peut jamais connaître.
Mots-clés
non-philosophie,	immanence,	Un,	différence,	réel
